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But if the soul of man, being immaterial, is thus proved to be immortal, what shall we say of the souls of the lower orders of animals? For they
manifest phenomena of mind as well as men. They remember, fear, imagine, compare; manifest gratitude, anger, sorrow, desire, etc. Bishop Warburton says:
I think it may be strictly demonstrated that man has an immaterial soul but then, the same arguments which prove that, prove,
likewise that the souls of all living animals are immaterial.
Whoever, therefore, affirms the immortality of man from the immateriality of his soul, is bound to affirm the same, not only of the nobler animals,
but also of the lower orders of the brute creation. Here, believers in natural immortality are crushed beneath the weight of their own arguments. If it be said that God can, if he choose,
blot from existence the immaterial soul of the beetle and the titmouse, So, we reply, can he that of man; and then its immortality is at an end, and the whole argument is abandoned.
2. "Matter Cannot Think." This is the favorite proposition on which the airy phantom of the immortality of the soul relies for its
support. Since man does think, and matter cannot think, the mind or soul must be immaterial and immortal. It is one thing to make such an assertion; it is quite another thing to prove it;
and the proof lies not within the power of man. This point has already been alluded to in Chapter II of this work. A little further evidence out of the mass that might be given, to show
that all the phenomena of mind are the result of organization, may here be in place.
That mind, like electricity, may be a property of matter, or result from material causes, Sidney Smith very clearly states as follow:
The existence of matter must be conceded, in an argument which has for its object the proof that there is something besides; and when
that is admitted, the proof rests with the skeptic, who con- ceives that the intervention of some other principle is necessary to account for the phenomena presented to our experience. The
hidden qualities of this substance must be detected, and its whole attributes known, before we can be warranted in assuming the existence of something else as necessary to the
production of what is presented to our consciousness. And when such a principle as that of galvanism or electricity, confessedly a property of matter, can be present in, or absent from, a
body; attract, repel, and move, without adding to or subtracting from the weight, heat, size, color, or any other quality of' a corpuscle, it will require some better species of logic than
any hitherto presented to establish the impossibility of mind being a certain form, quality, or accessory of matter, inherent in, and never separated from, it. We do not argue thus because
we are confident that there exists nothing but matter; for, in truth, our feeling is that the question is involved in too much mystery to entitle us to speak with the boldness of settled
conviction on either side. But we assume this position, because we think the burden of proof falls on the spiritualists, and that they have not established the necessity of inferring the
existence of another entity besides matter to account for all the phenomena of mind, by having failed to exhaust all the possible qualities or probable capacities of that substance which
they labor so assiduously to degrade and despise. But while they have altogether failed to establish this necessity, whereon depends their entire proposition, they have recourse to the
usual expedients of unsuccessful logicians, by exciting the ignorant prejudices of bigotry and intolerance, against all that is dignified with the name of dispassionate philosophy. The
truth is, it is time that all this fudge and cant about the doctrine of materialism, which affects the theory of immortality in no shape whatever--as the God who appointed the end could as
easily ordain that the means might be either through the medium of matter or spirit--should be fairly put down by men of common sense and metaphysical discrimination.
On the same point, Mr. W. G. Moncrieff says:
Often do we hear the words, `Matter cannot think,' and the trumpet of orthodoxy summons us to attend. In our simplicity we have been led to
reason thus: Matter cannot think. God made man of the dust of the ground: then of course man cannot think! He may grow like a palm-tree, but can reason no more than it. Now this
argumentation seems really valid, and yet every human being in his senses laughs it to scorn. I do think, is the protest of each child of humanity. Then if you do, we respond, in
your case, matter must perform the functions of reflection and kindred operations. More than living organization you are not; and if you declare living, organized matter incapable of
thought, we are bound to infer that you have no thought at all. Accepting your premises, we must hand you the conclusion. The logic is good, but we are generous enough to allow that we
cannot subscribe to it. It has often occurred to us as a fair procedure, just for the sake of bringing orthodoxy to a stand, to assert that spirit cannot think; of course, we are only
referring to created beings, on this occasion. We have often tried to understand the popular idea of a spirit; and we must confess that it defies our apprehension. It is something, nothing;
a substance, an essence; everything by turns, and nothing long. To believe that such a production could evolve thought, is an inordinate demand on human credulity. How the expedient was
resorted to, we cannot tell; was it because thought is invisible, that this invisible parent was sought for it? Then why not trace heat beyond the fire, perfume beyond the rose, attraction
beyond the sun, and vitality beyond the branchy oak? Of all insane fancies, this popular idea of the human spirit is the most complete; we have no wish to give offense, but the truth must
be spoken.
We arraign this theory also before the majesty of the brute creation. What about the immaterial minds of the lower animals? Does matter think in
their cases? Or have they also immortal souls? Dogs, horses, monkeys, elephants, etc., have been taught to perform different acts, imitate various movements, and even to dance the same tune
over and over again, to accompanying strains of music -- acts which involve the exercise of memory, will, reason, and judgment.
The exercise of high mental powers is shown in the intelligence and sagacity of the horse and elephant; in the manifold cunning of the fox; in the
beaver and bee, which construct their houses with such mechanical ingenuity; in the mules of the Andes, which thread with so sure a foot the gloomy gorges and craggy heights of the
mountains; and in the dogs of St. Bernard, as they rescue benighted and half-frozen travelers in the passes of the Alps. Hogg, the Ettrick shepherd, speaking of the sagacity of one of his
dogs, says:
He had never turned sheep in his life; but as soon as he discovered that it was his duty to do so, and that it obliged me, I can never
forget with what anxiety and eagerness he learned his different evolutions; he would try every way, deliberately, till he found out what I wanted him to do; and when once I made him
understand a direction, he never mistook or forgot it. Well as I knew him, he often astonished me; for when hard pressed in accomplishing the task which was set him, he had expedients of
the moment that bespoke a great share of the reasoning faculty
John Locke, the distinguished writer on metaphysical questions, says:
Birds' learning of tunes, and the endeavors one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me that they have
perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns. . . . It seems as evident to me that they [brutes] do reason, as that they have sense."
Pritchard on the Vital Principle, says:
Sensation is an attribute of the mind, and the possession of mind certainly extends as far as its phenomena. Whatever beings have conscious
feeling, have, unless the preceding arguments amount to nothing, souls, or immaterial minds, distinct from the substance of which they appear to us to be composed. If all animals feel,
all animals have souls."
H. H. Dobney says:
While consciousness, reason, and the sense of right and wrong, are among the highest attributes of man, these in a degree are allowed to be
possessed by some at least of the brute creation. Dr. Brown, according to his biographer, Dr. Welsh, "believed that many of the lower animals have the sense of right and wrong; and that the
metaphysical argument which proves the immortality of man, extends with equal force to the other orders of earthly existence."
Similar views are attributed to Coleridge and Cudworth.
Dalton says:
The possession of this kind of intelligence and reasoning power, is not confined to the human species. We have already seen that there are
many instinctive actions in man as well as in animals. It is no less true that, in the higher animals, there is often the same exercise of reasoning power as in man The
degree of this power is much less in them than in him, but its nature is the same. Whenever, in an animal, we see any action performed with the evident intention of accomplishing a
particular object, such an act is plainly the result of reasoning power, not essentially different from our own.
The establishment of sentinels by gregarious animals, to warn the herd of the approach of danger; the recollection of punishment inflicted for a
particular action, and the subsequent avoidance or concealment of that action; the teachability of many animals, and their capacity of forming new habits, or improving the old ones -- are
instances of the same kind of intellectual power, and are quite different from instinct, strictly speaking. It is this faculty which especially predominates over the other in the
higher classes of animals, and which finally attains its maximum of development in the human species.
With these testimonies from such eminent witnesses, we leave the friends of the rational argument inextricably mixed up with the brute creation. The
legitimate result of their theory is to confer immortality upon all orders of animated existence. We are sometimes accused of de- grading man to the level of the brute. But if our friends
of the other side elevate all brutes up to the level of man, how does that practically differ from what they accuse us of doing? The result is the same. If all come at last upon the same
level, it matters not whether brutes come up, or man goes down.
But our view is not open to this objection. While we deny that immortality is proved for either man or beast by any vital or mental powers which they
may exhibit, our theory finds a superior position for man in his more refined mental and physical organization, whereby he becomes possessed of a higher mental and a moral nature, and is
the proper recipient of the hope of immortality.
Another fact on which it is supposed that an argument for immortality can be founded is:
3. The Capacities of the Soul: The mind of man, it is argued, by its wonderful achievements, and its lofty aspirations, shows itself
capable of some higher and better state of being than we at present enjoy. And from this the conclusion is easy (if people will not stop to scan very critically the connection) that such a
state of being inevitably awaits mankind, in which they are destined to live forever.
But this argument, which, stripped of its disguise, is simply an egotistical assertion-- I am fit to be a god, and therefore I am a god-- will be
found to collapse under very slight pressure. Mr. J. Panton Ham describes it in fitting terms, when he speaks of it as follows:
Because a man has skin and ability, is he therefore immortal? We, in our ignorance and imperfection, would exalt the intellectual above the
moral. The former has greater attractions for imperfect man than the latter. Had we the peopling of paradise, we should fill it with the world's heroes in literature, science, and
the arts. The skilful are the world's saints, and the proper candidates for heaven's "many mansions." This argument, dispassionately considered apart from the imposing parade of human
achievements, is just this Man is clever, therefore he is immortal. Here is neither logic nor religion. The cleverness of man is surely no title to immortality, much less is
it the proof of its possession. It is a silly logic which asserts human immortality from such strange premises as balloons and pyramids, electro-telegraphs and railways.
But all men cannot engineer the construction of a pyramid, nor construct a balloon, nor build an engine, much less accomplish the greater feat
involved in their first invention. All men are not learned and skilful, and of such eminent capabilities. Is it not, in fact, almost an infinitely small proportion of the human race that
has manifested those great powers on which this argument is based? And can the capacities of a few leading minds determine the destiny of the great mass of men who possess no such powers?
And if an argument may be based on the capacities of some, may not an equal and opposite argument be based on the incapacities of others? And in this
case, on which side would the weight of evidence lie? And as there is almost every conceivable gradation of intelligence, who will tell us whereabouts in this scale the infinite endowment
of immortality is first perceptible? Looking at the human race, and the races immediately below, we behold a point where they seem to blend indistinguishably into each other. Will an utter
lack of capacity be affirmed of the higher orders of the brute creation? And descending in the scale, where shall we stop? Where is the transition from immortality to mortality?
We have given, in the preceding portion of this chapter, extracts from eminent authors, showing that brutes reason; that they exercise, to a degree,
all the powers of the human mind; that they have a sense, to some extent, of right and wrong, and give evidence of the same nature as man is able to give in reference to himself; that they
possess just as immaterial a soul as he. And have we not all seen horses and dogs that gave evidence of possessing more good sense than some men? And in this graduated scale of
animated existence, again we ask, Where is the dividing line between the mortal and the immortal? Will some one locate it? What degree of mental capacity is necessary to constitute an
evidence of immortality? And here we leave this argument. It demands no further notice till its friends who base immortality on mental capacity will determine which class of their less
fortunate brothers is so low as to be beyond its reach.
4. Universal Belief and Inborn Desire: Men have universally believed in the immortality of the soul, it is claimed, and all men desire
it; therefore, all men have it. Strange conclusion from strange premises! As to the first part of this argument -- the universal belief -- that appears not to be true, in fact. On this, a
glance at a quotation or two must suffice. Whately says:
We find Socrates and his disciples represented by Plato as fully admitting in their discussions of the subject, that "men in general were
highly incredulous as to the soul's future existence." The Epicurean school openly contended against it. Aristotle passes it by as not worth considering, and takes for granted the contrary
supposition, as not needing proof.
Leland, on the Advantages of Revelation, says: When Cicero "sets himself to prove the immortality of the soul, he represents the contrary as the
prevailing opinion," there being "crowds of opponents, not the Epicureans only; but, which he could not account for, those that were the most learned persons, had that doctrine in
contempt."
Touching the other portion of the argument, the universal and inborn desire, those who make use of it, to make it of any avail, are bound to supply
and prove the suppressed premise, which is that all men have what they desire. The syllogism would stand thus: 1. All men desire immortality. 2. All men have what they desire. 3.
Conclusion: Therefore, all men are immortal. This is a fair statement of the question; but are any presumptuous enough to take the ground that all may have what they desire? Is it true, in
fact? Do not our everyday observations give it the unqualified lie? Men desire riches, but do all possess them? They desire health, but do all have it? They desire happiness here, but what
an infinitely small portion of the race are really happy!
To try to get over the matter by saying that these desires that men have may be gratified by their taking a right course, is an abandonment of
the whole argument; for that is the very condition of immortality. All men may gratify their desires here by taking a right course; so all men may have immortality by taking a right course;
and those only will have it in whom those conditions are found to be scrupulously complied with; but they may comply with them, and thus obtain it.
But there is another fatal flaw in this argument in another respect; for it is not immortality in the abstract that is the object of this great
desire among men, but happiness. And the very persons who contend for immortality because men desire it, hold that a great portion of the race will be forever miserable. But this is
not what men desire; and not being what they desire, it fol- lows that all will not obtain what they desire, and hence the argument built on desire is good for nothing on their own showing.
It simply proves universal salvation, or that men will be forever happy because all men desire it, or it proves nothing.
5. The Analogies of Nature: The day shuts down in darkness, but it is not forever lost; the morn returns again, and the bright sun
comes forth rejoicing as a strong man to run a race. Nature is bound, cold arid lifeless, in the icy chains of winter; but it is not lost in absolute death. Anon the spring approaches, and
at its animating voice and warm breath, the pulse of life beats again through all her works; her cold cheek kindles with the glow of fresh vitality, and she comes forth adorned with new
beauty, waking new songs of praise in every grove. The chrysalis, too, that lay apparently a dead worm, motionless and dry, soon wakes up to a higher life, and comes forth gloriously
arrayed, like a "living blossom of the air," sipping nectar from the choicest sweets of earth, amid nestling in the bosom of its fairest flowers. And so, too, it is claimed of man, "that
when the body shall drop as a withered calyx, the soul shall go forth like a winged seed."
Let us take care that here our judgments are not led captive by the fascinations of poetry, or the rhetorical beauties of which this argument is so
eminently susceptible. Among the many instances of nature, we find only a few that furnish the analogies here presented. The chrysalis, so often referred to, after it has spent its brief
day as a living butterfly, perishes and is heard of no more forever. So with all the higher order of brutes: they fall in death, and make no more their appearance upon our path. The most,
then, that can be drawn from this argument, is a faint foreshadowing, perhaps, of a future life. But here, let it be understood, there is no issue. We all agree that all the members of the
human race shall be called again to life. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." 1Corinthians 15:22. But the point at issue is, Are our souls immortal, and must this life be,
to all our race, necessarily eternal? To prove that man will live again is one thing; to prove that that life will be eternal is quite another.
6. The Anomalies of the Present State: How often do we here see the wicked spreading himself like a green bay-tree, having more than
heart could wish, while the righteous grope their way along, in trouble and want! The wicked are exalted, and the good are oppressed. This does not look like the arrangement of a God who is
the patron of virtue and the enemy of vice. It is therefore argued that there will be another state in which all these wrongs shall be righted, virtue rewarded, amid wickedness punished.
Yes, we reply, there will. But certainly a space of time infinitely short of eternity would suffice to correct all the anomalies of this brief life, which so 54 Horticultral Address, by E.
H. Chapin. puzzle men here. This argument, like the former, may be a fair inference for a future state; it may portend to the ungodly a scene of retribution, but can prove nothing as to its
duration.
7. Immortality Assumed: We are told that the Bible assumes the immortality of the soul as a truth so evident that it is not necessary
expressly to affirm it. This is why the doctrine has come to be so generally received, notwithstanding there is such explicit evidence against it. It has been taken for
granted! Says Bishop Tillotson: "The immortality of the soul is rather supposed, or taken for granted, than expressly revealed, in the Bible."
"It is taken for granted " that immortality is an essential attribute of the soul, and that therefore for the Bible to affirm it would be mere
tautology. But we reply, Is not immortality an essential attribute also of Jehovah? Yet the Bible has been tautological enough plainly to state this fact. And it would seem that it might
have carried its ``tautology" a little further, and told us as much, at least once, about the soul, if that, too, is immortal; for surely its immortality cannot be more essential
than that of Jehovah.
8. Annihilation impossible: Nature everywhere revolts, we are told, against the doctrine of annihilation, and everywhere proves it
false; for nothing ever has been, nor ever can be, annihilated. To which we reply, Very true; and here we would correct the impression which some seem to entertain, that we believe in any
such annihilation of the wicked, or the annihilation of anything as matter. In reference to the wicked, we simply affirm that they will be annihilated as living beings, the matter of which
they are composed passing into other forms. The second definition of annihilate, according to Webster, is, "To destroy the form or the peculiar distinctive properties, so that the specific
thing no longer exists; as, to annihilate a forest by emitting and carrying away the trees, though the timber may still exist; to annihilate a house by demolishing the
structure." Just so of the wicked: They are annihilated only as conscious, intelligent beings, being resolved into their original elements.  |